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PART I: REPLY BRIEF AS APPELLANT
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The Commonwealth concedes that it cannot bring suit as parens patriae, to
remove its citizens from the reach of federal law, and fails to demonstrate any other
basis for standing. Virginia does not dispute that the purpose of its statute is to
exempt its citizens from federal law, as Virginia’s leaders proclaimed when the
statute was passed.
Virginia asserts that its statute also would preclude local governments and
private employers from requiring the purchase of insurance. The minimum coverage
provision that Virginia challenges here, however, applies only to individuals, and
does not prevent Virginia from barring entities other than the United States from
requiring insurance.
II. Although the Commonwealth insists that the minimum coverage provision
is not a proper means to regulate interstate commerce, it disputes none of the premises
of the statute. The Commonwealth recognizes that virtually all individuals participate
in the market for health care services. It does not dispute that an individual’s demand
for health care services may arise unexpectedly; that medical expenses often far
exceed the resources of even the most prudent individuals; and that the cost of
uncompensated medical services is shifted to other consumers, inflating insurance
premiums.
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The Commonwealth’s argument boils down to the contention that Congress has
not regulated individuals in their “capacity” as participants in the health care market,
but “on account of the passive status of being uninsured.” Pl. Br. 46. That argument
has no basis in Commerce Clause doctrine, disregards the express findings in the Act,
and defies common sense. The purpose of health insurance is to pay for expenses
incurred in the health care services market. That some participants in the health care
market may be “passive” in the insurance market — in the sense that they may not
currently have insurance — has no constitutional significance.
III. In urging that the minimum coverage provision is not a valid exercise of
the taxing power, the Commonwealth recites contentions that have long been laid to
rest. The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected claims, such as that advanced by
Virginia, that a provision is not a tax because its purpose “is to alter conduct in hopes
that the penalty will not be collected at all.” Pl. Br. 55. The minimum coverage
provision has none of the hallmarks of a “punitive” sanction, and its validity as a tax
does not turn on how it is denominated in the statute. The presumption that statutes
are constitutional requires that a court determine whether Congress has the
constitutional authority to adopt the minimum coverage provision, not whether
Congress used particular terminology in doing so.

2
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ARGUMENT
I.

Virginia Lacks Standing To Challenge the Minimum Coverage
Provision.
Virginia concedes that it cannot bring this action as parens patriae. Pl. Br. 13.

It fails, however, to demonstrate any other basis for standing.
The Commonwealth does not dispute that it enacted Virginia Code
§ 38.2-3430.1:1 to preclude the application of federal law to its citizens. That
purpose is evident from the face of the Virginia statute, which the district court
correctly characterized as merely “declaratory.” JA 308. It is likewise evident from
the pronouncements made by the Commonwealth’s leaders when the Virginia law
was enacted. Virginia’s Governor, in signing the Virginia law on the day after
enactment of the Affordable Care Act, expressly linked the state law with the federal
statute. Press Release, Virginia Governor McDonnell, Governor McDonnell Signs
Virginia Healthcare Freedom Act Legislation (Mar. 24, 2010) (“March 24 Press
Release”), http://www.governor.virginia.gov/news/viewRelease.cfm?id=88.

The

Lieutenant Governor, describing the new state law, said, “[W]e again assert that
decisions of this nature should be made on the state level, not in Washington, D.C.”
Ibid. The Attorney General proclaimed: “Clearly, what we’ve done in Virginia is set
a bar, where we do not accept the individual mandate for our citizens, and we’ll

3
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defend that position.” Cuccinelli Ready To Defy Federal Health-Insurance Mandate,
Richmond Times-Dispatch (Feb. 4, 2010); see also March 24 Press Release (Virginia
Attorney General noted “opposition to the new federal health care law” as a result of
which “the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act is being signed today”).
The Attorney General proceeded to “defend that position” by bringing this
lawsuit. The Commonwealth argues that, by enacting § 38.2-3430.1:1, it created
standing where no justiciable controversy would otherwise exist: “The Virginia law
transforms Tenth Amendment issues of the sort found to be merely abstract in Mellon
into an immediate and concrete dispute within the ambit of the sovereign standing
cases.” Pl. Br. 18.
But as our opening brief explained, this reasoning would allow any state to
create standing to challenge any federal policy or statute by enacting a state statute
to preclude the application of federal law to its residents. The Commonwealth does
not argue otherwise and, indeed, embraces that result. It declares that “[t]he
Secretary’s hypotheticals, positing that a State could legislate against Social Security
taxes or the federal war powers, fail to appreciate that litigants frequently have
standing to lose on the merits.” Pl. Br. 16-17. In other words, the Commonwealth
believes that a state can create standing by declaring that its citizens may not be
called to service pursuant to the federal war powers, although the state might not
4
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prevail in the litigation on the merits.
The Commonwealth makes no attempt to reconcile this position with the
Supreme Court’s unambiguous pronouncement that “it is no part of [a State’s] duty
or power to enforce [its citizens’] rights in respect of their relations with the federal
government.” Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923). The Supreme
Court has made clear that “there is a critical difference between allowing a State ‘to
protect her citizens from the operation of federal statutes’ (which is what Mellon
prohibits) and allowing a State to assert its rights under federal law (which it has
standing to do).” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007). Virginia’s
position would obliterate this distinction and nullify the limitation on parens patriae
standing that has stood for almost 90 years.
The Commonwealth places great reliance on Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54
(1986), declaring that “[t]he Secretary reads [Mellon] as though Diamond had never
been decided.” Pl. Br. 15. As the Commonwealth notes, Diamond recites the
uncontroversial proposition that “a State has standing to defend the constitutionality
of its statute.” Pl. Br. 13 (quoting Diamond, 476 U.S. at 62). The issue in Diamond
was whether a private citizen could intervene to seek review of a court of appeals
decision that held a state abortion statute unconstitutional, after the state declined to
challenge the ruling. The Supreme Court noted that “Diamond’s attempt to maintain
5
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the litigation is, then, simply an effort to compel the State to enact a code in accord
with Diamond’s interests.” Diamond, 476 U.S. at 65. However, “[b]ecause the State
alone is entitled to create a legal code, only the State has the kind of ‘direct stake’
[required to] defend[] the standards embodied in that code.” Ibid. The Diamond
decision did not involve a lawsuit by a state, much less a lawsuit by a state against the
federal government to enjoin application of a federal statute that, by its terms, applies
only to private persons.
Virginia also asserts that, “[w]hen the claimed powers of the States and the
federal government collide, the Supreme Court usually addresses the merits without
even addressing standing.” Pl. Br. 22 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)). But as our opening brief explained
(Def. Br. 29), the federal statutes at issue in those cases directly regulated the states.
New York addressed a federal law that required states to enact a scheme for the
disposal of low-level radioactive waste or else to take title to the waste.
Mitchell addressed a federal law that barred states from requiring literacy tests or
disqualifying voters for failure to meet state residency requirements. The Affordable
Care Act’s minimum coverage provision, by contrast, applies only to individuals.
Virginia cites Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458
U.S. 592 (1982), for the proposition that it has “‘sovereign power over individuals
6
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and entities within the relevant jurisdiction,’” Pl. Br. 14 (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at
601), and asserts that it thus has “sovereign standing” to “‘enforce[] ... its own
statute[]’” through this suit, Pl. Br. 13 (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137
(1986)). The citation is correct, but the validity of the assertion does not follow. The
United States is not an “individual[]” or “entit[y]” over whom Virginia has “sovereign
power.” Pl. Br. 14; see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 429 (1819) (“The
sovereignty of a state extends to everything which exists by its own authority, or is
introduced by its permission; but does it extend to those means which are employed
by congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the people of
the United States? We think it demonstrable, that it does not.”). This is not a statute
that Virginia can “enforce.”

It is, as the district court recognized, merely

“declaratory.” JA 303.
As noted in our opening brief (Def. Br. 29), it may be assumed that in some
circumstances a state may have standing to challenge federal action that significantly
disrupts that state’s regulation of its own citizens. Thus, in the Tenth Circuit case on
which Virginia relies, Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1242
(10th Cir. 2008), the court found standing on the ground that the federal action
“interfere[d] with Wyoming’s ability to enforce its legal code.” The minimum
coverage provision, however, effects no such disruption. Virginia asserts that its new
7
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law prevents local governments and private employers from requiring insurance, Pl.
Br. 14, although it cites no examples of such insurance requirements. The assertion
is irrelevant, however, because the Affordable Care Act does not prevent Virginia
from barring local governments and private employers from requiring insurance. The
minimum coverage provision applies only to individuals and, if Virginia wishes to
preclude entities other than the United States from imposing their own insurance
requirements, the minimum coverage provision poses no obstacle.
Thus, no conflict between federal and state law exists insofar as Virginia seeks
to preclude its local governments and private employers from requiring the purchase
of health insurance. Because federal law does not preempt the operation of state law,
Virginia has no basis to seek an order declaring the federal statute unconstitutional.
A conflict exists only to the extent that Virginia seeks to “protect her citizens
from the operation of” the federal statute. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17
(2007). That, the Supreme Court has made abundantly clear, is exactly “what Mellon
prohibits.” Ibid.
Just recently, the Supreme Court affirmed yet again the importance of such
limitations on standing to sue. In Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v.
Winn, __ S. Ct. __ (Apr. 4, 2011), 2011 WL 1225707, *14, the Court declared:
Few exercises of the judicial power are more likely to undermine public
8
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confidence in the neutrality and integrity of the Judiciary than one which
casts the Court in the role of a Council of Revision, conferring on itself
the power to invalidate laws at the behest of anyone who disagrees with
them. In an era of frequent litigation, class actions, sweeping
injunctions with prospective effect, and continuing jurisdiction to
enforce judicial remedies, courts must be more careful to insist on the
formal rules of standing, not less so. Making the Article III standing
inquiry all the more necessary are the significant implications of
constitutional litigation, which can result in rules of wide applicability
that are beyond Congress’ power to change.
Virginia’s elastic theory of standing would cast courts in precisely the role the
Supreme Court sought to avoid.
II.

The Minimum Coverage Provision Is a Valid Exercise of Congress’s
Commerce Power.
The Commonwealth repeatedly attacks a theory of constitutional authority of

its own invention, a theory that the federal government has not invoked and that bears
no relationship to the statute Congress actually enacted. It is common ground in this
case that there is no federal police power and that Congress may not exceed the
limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause, as articulated by the Supreme
Court in Lopez and Morrison. In those cases, which involved noneconomic standalone federal statutes unconnected to any comprehensive regulatory program, the
Court “found the effects of those activities on interstate commerce insufficiently
robust” and “emphasized the noneconomic nature of the regulated conduct.” Sabri
v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 607 (2004). This case, in contrast to Lopez and
9

Case: 11-1057

Document: 161

Date Filed: 04/08/2011

Page: 21

Morrison, involves a comprehensive regulation of a quintessentially economic subject
matter with an extraordinarily robust impact on interstate commerce: the way in
which consumption of services is financed in the massive interstate health care
market.
It has been settled since McCulloch that the federal government, which is
“intrusted with such ample powers, ... must also be intrusted with ample means for
their execution.” 17 U.S. at 408. Accordingly, Congress may employ any means that
are “‘“reasonably adapted” to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce
power’ or under other powers that the Constitution grants Congress the authority to
implement.” United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1957 (2010) (quoting
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 37 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941))). Here, the requirement
that individuals pay for the goods and services they will inevitably consume in the
market in which they already participate is more than “reasonably adapted” to
Congress’s legitimate end of regulating the interstate market in health care.
A.

The Minimum Coverage Provision Properly Regulates
the Means by Which People Pay for Health Care Services.

1. Virginia does not take issue with Congress’s findings or the extensive
record on which they are based. Virginia does not dispute that people without

10
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insurance actively participate in the market for health care services, or that “the
uninsured consume $100 billion in health care services annually.” Pl. Br. 8. The
Commonwealth expressly acknowledges Congress’s finding that “$43 billion of this
amount is not paid to the provider.” Ibid.; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F).
Virginia similarly does not dispute that the cost of this uncompensated care is borne
not only by providers but also by other consumers: “Congress further found that
health care providers pass on a significant portion of these costs to private insurers,
which pass on the cost to families.” Pl. Br. 8; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F)
(costs are passed on from providers “to private insurers, which pass on the cost to
families,” thereby inflating family health insurance premiums “by on average over
$1,000 a year”).
These figures reflect several unique features of the health services market:
First, “the individual need for health care is temporally unpredictable.”
Pl. Br. 7. Indeed, “[m]ost medical expenses for people under 65” result “from the
‘bolt-from-the-blue’ event of an accident, a stroke, or a complication of pregnancy
that we know will happen on average but whose victim we cannot (and they cannot)
predict well in advance.” Expanding Consumer Choice and Addressing “Adverse
Selection” Concerns in Health Insurance: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm.
32 (2004) (Prof. Pauly).
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Second, medical “procedures are expensive,” Pl. Br. 7, and unexpected medical
costs can easily dwarf other personal expenses. Indeed, 62% of all personal
bankruptcies are caused in part by medical expenses. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(G).
“Even routine medical procedures, such as MRIs, CT scans, colonoscopies,
mammograms, and childbirth, to name a few, cost more than many Americans can
afford.” Amicus Br. of Economic Scholars, at 9 (Doc. 39-1). “Given the extremely
high costs of health care for all but the most routine treatments and procedures, the
cost of medical care is beyond the means of all but the most wealthy Americans.”
Ibid. Health insurance is thus the usual means by which Americans pay for health
care. Ibid.; Def. Br. 8-9.
Third, unlike in other markets, consumers are legally entitled to obtain
extremely expensive health care services without regard to their ability to pay.
Although the Commonwealth describes these requirements — which are grounded
in the common law as well as in state and federal statutes — as “market distortions,”
Pl. Br. 43, Congress can properly regulate the market as it exists, not as the
Commonwealth wishes it to be. The Commonwealth does not dispute that in the real
world, the uninsured receive tens of billions of dollars of services each year for which
they do not pay.
The Commonwealth thus does not and cannot controvert that health insurance
12
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is a method — in fact, the principal method — of paying for health care services, as
opposed to a product that stands alone in its own isolated market. Indeed, the
University of Virginia has imposed its own minimum coverage requirement precisely
because insurance coverage is necessary to pay medical expenses. The University’s
website explains that “[a]ll students are required by the University to have health
insurance, either under a parent’s plan or purchased independently.” It further
explains that “[this] requirement assures that resources are available to cover inpatient
or specialty care or expenses related to accidents or injuries.” Elson Student Health
Center at the University of Virginia, http://www.virginia.edu/studenthealth/
insurance.html (last modified Mar. 21, 2011) (bold omitted). These are, of course,
the principal purposes of all health insurance.1
The Commonwealth does not dispute that the Affordable Care Act’s minimum
coverage provision will substantially reduce levels of uncompensated care and the
consequent shifting of costs to other consumers. And it does not dispute the
observation of three district courts, quoted in the Commonwealth’s brief, Pl. Br. 46,
that “‘the individuals subject to [the minimum coverage provision] are either present
or future participants in the national health care market.’” Mead v. Holder, __ F.

1

As our opening brief explained (Def. Br. 25), Virginia Code § 38.2-3430.1:1
exempts the Commonwealth’s “institution[s] of higher education.”
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Supp. 2d __ (D.D.C. 2011), 2011 WL 611139, *18 (citing Liberty Univ., Inc. v.
Geithner, __ F. Supp. 2d __ (W.D. Va. 2010), 2010 WL 4860299, *15; Thomas More
Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 894 (E.D. Mich. 2010)). Accordingly, as
each of these courts concluded, the minimum coverage provision is a proper means
of regulating payments for services in the health care market.
2. The Commonwealth admits that the individuals subject to the minimum
coverage provision are “present or future participants in the national healthcare
market,” Pl. Br. 46, but asserts that they “are not being regulated when acting in this
capacity.” Ibid. Instead, the Commonwealth declares, “[t]hey are being regulated on
account of the passive status of being uninsured.” Ibid.
This contention — which is the central premise of plaintiff’s commerce power
argument — is wrong. The individuals subject to the minimum coverage provision
actively participate in the health care market, and the health insurance requirement
addresses the risks and costs that they incur and benefits they receive in that market.
The insurance requirement regulates how and when individuals will pay for the
services they will consume in a market in which they already participate. That some
individuals may be “passive” in the insurance market, in the sense of currently “being
uninsured,” Pl. Br. 46, has no analytical or constitutional significance. Those
individuals have simply chosen to attempt to pay for the services they will consume
14
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in some other way “with a backstop of uncompensated care funded by third parties.”
Thomas More Law Ctr., 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894. Insurance requirements are not
imposed because of participation in the insurance market; they are imposed to ensure
that costs are not externalized in other markets. Health insurance “is the means by
which we pay for health care,” and the minimum coverage provision “assure[s] that
all Americans, to the extent that they can afford it, contribute to the costs of their own
health care by maintaining reasonable insurance coverage.” Amicus Br. of Economic
Scholars, at 2 (Doc. 39-1).
Virginia’s only answer is to declare that the minimum coverage provision does
not “regulate[] the means of payment for services in the interstate healthcare market,”
because “it is obvious that it expressly regulates inactivity antecedent to any activity
for which payment would be required.” Pl. Br. 23. The Commonwealth does not
elaborate on this contention, but it presumably refers to the views of the district courts
in this case and in Florida ex rel. Bondi v. HHS, __ F. Supp. 2d __ (N.D. Fla. 2011),
2011 WL 285683, that the health insurance requirement must be linked to a specific
purchase of health care services. The Florida court recognized that Congress “plainly
has the power to regulate” individuals “at the time that they initially seek medical
care,” but believed that Congress exceeded its authority by failing to link the
insurance requirement to a specific health care purchase. Id. at *26. Similarly, the
15
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district court in this case concluded that Congress cannot require “advance purchase
of insurance based upon a future contingency.” JA 1097.
This view fundamentally misunderstands the nature of both health insurance,
which is linked to the specific health care purchases that it pays for, and insurance
markets generally, which could not function if an individual could delay purchasing
coverage until he was about to incur a liability that would be covered. Moreover, the
future consumption of health care services is “contingent” only in the sense that “the
individual need for health care is temporally unpredictable.” Pl. Br. 7. Virtually all
people have already entered the market for health services, and the vast majority
consume health care services each year. E.g., Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (“CDC”), National Center for Health Statistics, Health, United States,
2009, table 80 (2010). And it is common ground that even people who have not
obtained health care in the recent past may incur massive unforeseen medical costs
at any time. Virginia does not identify any principle of Commerce Clause doctrine
that requires that future health care purchases be specifically identifiable at the time
an insurance requirement takes effect. As our opening brief explained (Def. Br. 4446), the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the contention that the exercise of the
commerce power must await specific commercial transactions.
The Commonwealth insists that, if the minimum coverage provision is valid,
16
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it follows that Congress also can require people to buy commodities like “wheat,”
Pl. Br. 43, or “broccoli,” Pl. Br. 48 (citing a hypothetical posed to Harvard Law
Professor Charles Fried). In a similar vein, the district court in Florida suggested that
a minimum coverage requirement is no different than a requirement “that everyone
above a certain income threshold buy a General Motors automobile.” Florida, __ F.
Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 285683, *24.
This reasoning disregards the fundamental distinctions between the minimum
coverage provision and these imaginary schemes. Unlike those schemes, the
minimum coverage provision regulates the way people pay for goods and services in
a market — the interstate health care market — in which they already participate.
The provision is thus not properly viewed as a regulation of “inactivity.” All people
risk facing the unforeseen need for expensive health care services; “individual need
for health care is temporally unpredictable,” Pl. Br. 7; and health insurance not a
commodity whose consumption is an end in itself; it is a financial instrument to pay
for health care services when the need arises.
In contrast, people do not confront unexpected life-or-death needs for a
Cadillac, and they do not carry insurance to finance future purchases of cars or
prohibitively expensive vegetables. And whereas patients are effectively guaranteed
expensive health care services in times of need regardless of their means, drivers must
17
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pay for their cars in order to drive them off the lot. In short, there is no logical
analogy between a provision that requires people to maintain health insurance to pay
for their health care services, and a hypothetical directive to buy broccoli or an
automobile. As the 41 economists who are amici here explain, the “unique factors”
that characterize the health care market “do not obtain in other markets” and, “without
them, the predicate for similar legislative mandates is absent.” Amicus Br. of
Economic Scholars, at 3 (Doc. 39-1); see also Amicus Br. of American Hospital
Ass’n, et al., at 21-22 (Doc. 46-1). Upholding the minimum coverage provision does
not in any way imply that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to impose the
farfetched laws the Commonwealth describes.
The Heritage Foundation stressed these unique features of the health care
market decades ago in urging that the government “[m]andate all households to
obtain adequate insurance.” It explained: “If a young man wrecks his Porsche and
has not had the foresight to obtain insurance, we may commiserate but society feels
no obligation to repair his car.” But, it observed, “health care is different. If a man
is struck down by a heart attack in the street, Americans will care for him whether or
not he has insurance. If we find that he has spent money on other things rather than
insurance, we may be angry but we will not deny him services — even if that means
more prudent citizens end up paying the tab.” Stuart M. Butler, The Heritage
18
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Lectures 218: Assuring Affordable Health Care for All Americans, at 6 (Heritage
Foundation 1989).
The Commonwealth’s focus on a purported distinction between “activity” and
“inactivity” — not a distinction on which any Commerce Clause decision by the
Supreme Court or this Court has ever turned — elides what is the dispositive inquiry,
whether the target of Congress’s regulation “substantially affect[s] interstate
commerce.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 16-17. It has long been settled that Congress can use
its commerce power to regulate even wholly intrastate conduct, so long as that
conduct has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Darby, 312 U.S.
at 119-20; see also id. at 124-25 (affirming Congress’s commerce authority to compel
employers to maintain records of “intrastate transaction[s],” i.e., the wages paid to
local employees). The Commonwealth posits that “the mode of regulation must fit
the enumerated power by executing it — not by altering its character.” Pl. Br. 39.
If regulation of purely intrastate conduct with a substantial effect on interstate
commerce satisfies this test (despite the Constitution’s text authorizing Congress only
to “regulate Commerce ... among the several States,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 3), then
surely so too does regulation of the means of payment in the massive interstate
healthcare market.
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The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Integral to the Affordable
Care Act’s Guaranteed-Issue and Community-Rating
Requirements.

1. The Commonwealth also does not contest that the minimum coverage
provision is instrumental to broader Affordable Care Act reforms that prevent
insurers from denying coverage or charging more because of pre-existing medical
conditions. Virginia recognizes that “non-employment based insurance is difficult
to obtain because of cost and underwriting for pre-existing conditions,” and
acknowledges that the Affordable Care Act directly addresses these serious problems
by restricting medical underwriting. Pl. Br. 8.
The Act thus makes everyone insurable, eliminates restrictive underwriting that
harms millions of consumers, and provides protection against ruinous medical
expenses.

These provisions regulate the “practical aspects of the insurance

companies’ methods of doing business,” which the Supreme Court long ago found
was well within the commerce power. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 541 (1944).
The Commonwealth nonetheless denounces the minimum coverage provision
as a requirement imposed “solely for the convenience of the government.” Pl. Br. 43.
This contention is both wrong and irrelevant. It is wrong because the beneficiaries
of the Affordable Care Act include, of course, the millions of Americans who
20
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otherwise would be unable to obtain affordable coverage, as well as the millions of
others to whom the costs of uncompensated care would otherwise be shifted. Thus,
the district court in Thomas More Law Center correctly explained that “[t]he
uninsured ... benefit from the ‘guaranteed issue’ provision in the Act, which enables
them to become insured even when they are already sick,” and that, even apart from
the other goals advanced by the minimum coverage provision, “[t]his benefit makes
imposing the minimum coverage provision appropriate.” 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894.
Plaintiff’s contention is, in any event, irrelevant, because it has no bearing on the
legal test articulated in Raich, 545 U.S. at 22, which focuses on whether the provision
forms part of a larger scheme of economic regulation.
In a similar vein, the Commonwealth concedes that the minimum coverage
provision forms part of a larger scheme of economic regulation, but argues that the
minimum coverage provision would not be necessary if not for another part of the
federal regulatory framework, the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor
Act (“EMTALA”). Virginia contends that EMTALA created “market distortions,”
Pl. Br. 43, and argues that “Congress cannot pass a law,” i.e., EMTALA, “and then
claim it must have all powers necessary to correct that distortion.” Pl. Br. 44. Again,
the argument reflects both factual and legal error.
As an initial matter, the obligation to provide emergency medical care
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regardless of ability to pay is reflected not only in EMTALA but in state statutes,
regulations, and common law duties, which in turn reflect a widely shared societal
understanding that it is unconscionable to deny emergency medical care to an
individual because of her economic choices. See Def. Br. 42-43. Virginia is thus
wrong in its apparent belief that, but for EMTALA, people without insurance would
be unable to obtain expensive health care; that everyone would have maximum
incentive to purchase insurance; and that, if they failed to do so, there would be no
uncompensated care and no corresponding cost-shifting.
Plaintiff’s argument reduces to the contention that uncompensated care and
cost-shifting would not exist in a hypothetical Hobbesian health care market in which
emergency rooms closed their doors to individuals in need of medical care. Congress,
however, has regulated the market that actually exists. Moreover, the relevant point,
for purposes of the Commerce Clause analysis, is that the Affordable Care Act does
indeed regulate the market for health care services and the payment for services
within that market. No case has ever suggested that Congress lacks Article I authority
to regulate a market because earlier regulations — both state and federal — have
affected market conditions. In Raich, for example, the Court did not invalidate
Congress’s regulation of homegrown marijuana for personal consumption on the
ground that such regulation was only necessary because Congress had decided to
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create a “market distortion” by prohibiting interstate commerce in the drug. To the
contrary, Congress has particular latitude to enact provisions in aid of its broader
regulatory programs. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22; id. at 37-38 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 475 (4th Cir. 2009). Congress can
certainly take into account the assurance of emergency medical care in regulating the
health care market under the Commerce Clause.
2.

Disregarding the substantial benefits of the Affordable Care Act’s

guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements, Virginia declares that these
provisions create “a perverse incentive for young healthy people to purchase
insurance only after they fall ill.” Pl. Br. 8. The Commonwealth further suggests,
without explanation, that the minimum coverage provision is necessary only because
of this “perverse incentive.” Ibid.
Here, too, Virginia quarrels with the wisdom of the market regulation, not with
the fact that the federal scheme regulates an interstate market. And, notwithstanding
its rhetoric, the Commonwealth does not dispute that the minimum coverage
provision addresses a problem that already exists and that a number of people “wait
to purchase health insurance until they need[] care.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I);
see also, e.g., Blumberg & Holahan, Do Individual Mandates Matter?, at 1 (Urban
Institute 2008). In making those calculations, many underestimate the impact that
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medical changes have on insurability. As the legislative record demonstrates,
insurers often deny coverage for conditions as common as high blood pressure, see
47 Million and Counting: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. 52
(2008) (Prof. Hall), and the four largest for-profit health insurance companies each
listed pregnancy as a medical condition that would result in the automatic denial of
individual health insurance coverage, see Chairman Waxman and Rep. Stupak,
Memorandum on Maternity Coverage in the Individual Health Insurance Market to
H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, at 1 (Oct. 12, 2010). Thus, if an expecting
mother had not already obtained insurance, she could be financially responsible for
the costs of prenatal care as well as the costs of delivery, which, for a
Caesarian-section, averages about $13,016. International Federation of Health Plans,
2010 Comparative Price Report: Medical and Hospital Fees by Country, at 12. Costs
that the expecting mother could not pay would be passed along to providers and to
other consumers, increasing the barriers to affordable insurance.
Virginia’s rhetoric also underscores some of the fundamental paradoxes in its
position. The Commonwealth implicitly recognizes that people should not wait to
“purchase insurance only after they fall ill.” Pl. Br. 8. Insurance requirements, by
their nature, take effect before claims are filed, and the Commonwealth does not
dispute that a “health insurance market could never survive or even form if people
24
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could buy their insurance on the way to the hospital.” 47 Million and Counting,
110th Cong. 52 (Prof. Hall). By Virginia’s own reasoning, it is thus clear that the
minimum coverage provision, and the broader scheme of which it forms a part,
constitute economic regulation in furtherance of a plainly legitimate Commerce
Clause end.
C.

No Precedent Suggests that the Minimum Coverage Provision Is
an Impermissible Means of Regulating Commerce.

1. The Commonwealth identifies no precedent that casts any doubt on the
validity of the minimum coverage provision. Virginia repeatedly invokes “the
negative outer limits of the Commerce Clause identified in” Lopez and Morrison,
Pl. Br. 4. Far from expanding the commerce power, our position here embraces both
the holdings and the limits imposed by those cases. Although the Commonwealth
invokes the specter of limitless federal power, it makes no attempt to address the
obvious differences between the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison and the
Affordable Care Act. Both decisions would come out exactly the same way, and for
the exact same reasons, under defendant’s view.
The Lopez statute addressed the possession of a firearm in the vicinity of a
school; the Morrison statute addressed acts of gender-motivated violence. The
“noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central” to the decisions.
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United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000). And, as the Court stressed in
Raich, neither statute formed part of a “larger regulation of economic activity.”
Raich, 545 U.S. at 24.
In Lopez and Morrison, the Court sought to preserve “a distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly local.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 (quoting
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995)). Accordingly, the Court
declined to sustain the regulation of noneconomic, criminal activity on the basis of
highly attenuated connections to interstate commerce. By contrast, the minimum
coverage provision regulates the way people pay for health care services — which is
quintessential economic activity — and forms part of the Affordable Care Act’s
broader regulation of interstate commerce.
Moreover, as Virginia does not dispute, health care, insurance, and health
insurance in particular have long been subject to federal regulation. Congress has
long regulated insurance markets. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at
552-53. The Supreme Court has observed that most insurance is sold by national or
regional companies that operate interstate and that are characterized by
“[i]nterrelationship, interdependence, and integration of activities in all the states in
which they operate.” Id. at 541. Further, “hospitals are regularly engaged in
interstate commerce, performing services for out-of-state patients and generating
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revenues from out-of-state sources.” Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313
F.3d 205, 213 (4th Cir. 2002). The federal government is pervasively involved in
regulating payments for hospital and physician services under the Medicare and
Medicaid programs, which consume approximately $750 billion of federal funds
annually. Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”), The Long-Term Budget Outlook,
at 29-30 (2010). Congress also has for decades regulated the content and availability
of group health insurance plans offered by large employers under ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001 et seq., and other statutes, and has long used tax incentives to finance
employer-based insurance. CBO, Key Issues In Analyzing Major Health Proposals,
at 30 (2008). Virginia could not and does not argue that a federal health insurance
requirement impermissibly blurs “a distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-568.
The Commonwealth also does not suggest that the states, rather than the federal
government, should resolve the serious problems addressed by the Affordable Care
Act. Nor does it urge that the states would be capable of addressing those problems
effectively in the absence of a federal solution. Indeed, the uninsured often cross
state lines for needed care, see Amicus Br. of the Governor of Washington, at 19-21
(Doc. 50-1), and “States’ attempts to reform the healthcare market come at great
risk,” as they could lead insurers to move out and needy individuals to move in,
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Thus, as even the

Commonwealth acknowledges, it is “uncontroversial” that the federal government has
“the power to regulate aspects of the healthcare system on a national basis.” Pl.
Br. 50.
2. Virginia does not advance its position by insisting that the minimum
coverage provision is the exercise of a “police power.” It is, of course, “no objection
to the assertion of the power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is
attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of the
states.” Darby, 312 U.S. at 114; see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 29 n.38 (rejecting the
suggestion that Congress must “cede its constitutional power to regulate commerce
whenever a State opts to exercise its ‘traditional police powers to define the criminal
law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens’”). Indeed, this
Court has repeatedly upheld federal statutes against claims that they are only
tangentially related to the regulation of commerce and instead represent an assertion
of a police power, in decisions that the Commonwealth fails to discuss in its brief.
In Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575 (4th Cir. 1997), for example, this Court
rejected the contention that the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act regulates
violence rather than commerce. The Court reasoned that obstruction of clinic
entrances, “while not itself economic or commercial, is closely and directly connected
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with an economic activity,” and explained that the Court “need not ‘pile inference
upon inference’ to find a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at 587
(quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567). In Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000),
this Court rejected a claim that a federal statute that barred the taking of a red wolf
on private land infringed on state police power, declaring that the statute did not
“trespass[] impermissibly upon traditional state functions — either control over
wildlife or local land use.” Id. at 500. The Court noted that, “[a]lthough the
connection to economic or commercial activity plays a central role in whether a
regulation will be upheld under the Commerce Clause, economic activity must be
understood in broad terms,” lest “a cramped view of commerce ... cripple a foremost
federal power and ... eviscerate national authority.” Id. at 491. And, in United States
v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2009), this Court held that the “comprehensive
federal registration system created by” the Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act is valid under the commerce power even though it “may implicate a sex offender
who does not cross state lines,” id. at 474-75, because “[r]equiring all sex offenders
to register is an integral part of Congress’ regulatory effort and ‘the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.’” Ibid.
(quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 24-25) (other citations omitted); see also Freilich, 313
F.3d at 213 (rejecting Tenth Amendment challenge to federal statute regulating
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physician peer review process and finding “no doubt concerning the power of
Congress to regulate a peer review process”).
The Commonwealth makes no attempt to reconcile its position with these
decisions, and its effort to distinguish the federal child pornography statute disregards
the holding of United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73 (4th Cir. 2005). The federal
statute applies even when an individual comes into possession of child pornography
passively, and, to avoid criminal liability, the individual must take reasonable steps
to destroy the visual depictions or report the matter to law enforcement officials, i.e.,
engage in “activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252(c). In attempting to harmonize these
provisions with the district court’s conclusion that Commerce Clause requirements
must be triggered by “some type of self-initiated action,”

JA 1098, the

Commonwealth notes that the child pornography statute has a “jurisdictional hook”
that requires use of the mails. Pl. Br. 49. In Forrest, however, this Court explicitly
held that the validity of the child pornography statute does not depend on the
jurisdictional element. This Court stressed that “an effective jurisdictional element
is certainly not required where, as here, the statute directly regulates economic
activity.” Forrest, 429 F.3d at 77 n.1 (citing Raich). The Court explained that, “[a]s
in Raich, the general regulatory scheme here governs ‘quintessentially economic’
activities,” and that, because “Congress possessed a rational basis for concluding that
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the local production and possession of child pornography substantially affect
interstate commerce, ‘the de minimis character of individual instances arising under
the statute is of no consequence.’” Id. at 79 (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 17, 25).
3. Unable to locate support for its position in the relevant decisions of the
Supreme Court and this Court, the Commonwealth offers a deeply flawed
understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Commonwealth asserts that
“any attempt to exercise an unenumerated power like the claimed power to require a
citizen to purchase a good or service from another citizen is automatically an invasion
of police powers reserved to the States,” and thus cannot be necessary and proper.
Pl. Br. 50. There is, of course, no enumerated power “to require a citizen to purchase
a good or service from another citizen,” ibid., just as there is no enumerated power
to incorporate a bank. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 406. Since McCulloch, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly made clear that “the relevant inquiry” under the Necessary and
Proper Clause is “simply ‘whether the means chosen are “reasonably adapted” to the
attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power’ or under other powers that
the Constitution grants Congress the authority to implement.” Comstock, 130 S. Ct.
at 1957 (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Darby, 312 U.S. at 121)). Accordingly, “in determining whether the
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a
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particular federal statute,” the Court asks “whether the statute constitutes a means that
is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.
As discussed in our opening brief, the scope of the Necessary and Proper clause
is illustrated not only by the Supreme Court’s decision involving the Commerce
Clause power, but also by its decisions concerning legislation that implements other
sources of congressional authority. See, e.g., Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317,
328 (1935) (upholding requirement that persons holding gold bullion, coin, or
certificates exchange them for paper currency). These decisions, and a range of
statutes, underscore plaintiff’s error in seeking to premise its argument on rhetorical
notions of “inactivity” or “passivity” in an artificially defined market.
Plaintiff asserts that statutes exercising powers other than the commerce power
are irrelevant to the examination of the rationality of the means by which Congress
has addressed payment in the health care market. The Supreme Court, however, has
not developed a separate Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence for each
enumerated power. Indeed, in Comstock, the Court concluded that a federal civilcommitment statute was “necessary and proper” without tethering that analysis to any
particular enumerated power. 130 S. Ct. at 1956. Comstock noted that Congress had
exercised its authority to establish federal crimes “in furtherance of, for example, its
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enumerated powers to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, to enforce civil
rights, to spend funds for the general welfare, to establish federal courts, to establish
post offices, to regulate bankruptcy, to regulate naturalization, and so forth.” Id. at
1957 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3, 4, 7, 9; id. amends. XIII-XV). The Court
held that the civil commitment statute was “necessary and proper” regardless of
which font of authority Congress utilized when enacting a prisoner’s underlying
crime and nowhere suggested the analysis would differ on a clause-by-clause basis.
Id. at 1957-1958.
That approach flows from McCulloch itself, which looked to the congressional
exercise of authority under its Article IV powers to inform its understanding of
whether legislation was necessary and proper to implement the commerce power. See
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 422 (explaining that Congress’s creation of corporate bodies
in the territories under its Article IV power indicated that creation of a corporation
would also be “a convenient, a useful, and essential instrument in the prosecution of
its fiscal operations” under Article I). Similarly, in Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S.
600, 605 (2004), the Court upheld Congress’s power under the Spending Clause to
criminalize bribery of state officials. The Court described its inquiry as “means-ends
rationality under the Necessary and Proper Clause,” citing McCulloch and Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981), which also
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involved a regulatory scheme enacted under the commerce power.2
4. As the centerpiece of its presentation, the Commonwealth recalls iconic
moments in American history and some of the Nation’s most solemn declarations of
our commitment to liberty. But the ideals of liberty cannot be invoked to support a
purported right to consume health care services without insurance and pass
overwhelming costs on to other market participants. The Framers did not specifically
include a textual provision about insurance requirements, but, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly observed, “[t]he Federal Government undertakes activities today that
would have been unimaginable to the Framers.” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1965
(quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 157). “The Framers demonstrated considerable
foresight in drafting a Constitution capable of such resilience through time.” Ibid.
III.

The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Also Independently Authorized
by Congress’s Taxing Power.
The minimum coverage provision is also independently authorized by

Congress’s taxing power. The provision operates as a tax, and it will produce billions

2

The Commonwealth’s reliance on Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997), for the proposition that “there is also a proper prong to the Necessary and
Proper Clause,” Pl. Br. 40, is misplaced. Printz held that Congress’s exercise of its
authority was improper because it “violate[d] the principle of state sovereignty” by
commandeering state officials. Printz, 521 U.S. at 923-24. No such interference with
state sovereignty is at issue here; the minimum coverage provision imposes no
obligation on the Commonwealth or its officers.
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of dollars in revenue each year once it takes effect. The Commonwealth’s contrary
position is a flawed attempt to revive “distinctions between regulatory and revenueraising taxes” that the Supreme Court has expressly “abandoned.” Bob Jones Univ.
v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974).
A.

The Minimum Coverage Provision Operates as a Tax
and Will Produce Billions of Dollars in Annual Revenue.

There is no doubt that the “practical operation” of the minimum coverage
provision is as a tax. Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363 (1941). The
provision amends the Internal Revenue Code to provide that a non-exempted
individual who fails to maintain a minimum level of insurance shall pay a monthly
penalty for so long as he fails to do so. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A. The amount of the
penalty is calculated as a percentage of household income for federal income tax
purposes, above a flat dollar amount and subject to a cap. Id. § 5000A(c). It is
reported on the individual’s federal income tax return for the taxable year, ibid., and
is “assessed and collected in the same manner as” other specified federal tax
penalties. Id. § 5000A(b)(2), (g). Individuals who are not required to file income tax
returns for a given year are not required to pay the penalty. Id. § 5000A(e)(2). The
taxpayer’s responsibility for family members depends on their status as dependents
under the Internal Revenue Code. Id. § 5000A(a), (b)(3). Taxpayers filing a joint tax

35

Case: 11-1057

Document: 161

Date Filed: 04/08/2011

Page: 47

return are jointly liable for the penalty. Id. § 5000A(b)(3)(B). And the Secretary of
the Treasury is empowered to enforce the penalty provision. Id. § 5000A(g).
The Commonwealth declares that a “tax” is “‘an exaction for the support of the
Government.’” Pl. Br. 54-55 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841 (1995)); cf. Williams v. Motley, 925 F.2d 741, 744 (4th Cir.
1991) (Virginia’s assessment for not having motor vehicle insurance is a tax). The
minimum coverage provision easily meets the standard. Assessments made pursuant
to the provision will be reported and paid with the taxpayer’s annual return, as part
of his annual tax liability. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b)(2). The revenues derived from
the provision will be paid into the general treasury. Id. § 7809.
The Commonwealth does not dispute that the minimum coverage provision will
be “productive of some revenue.” Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514
(1937). The Congressional Budget Office determined that the provision will raise at
least $4 billion a year for general revenues by 2019, see Letter from Douglas W.
Elmendorf, Director, CBO, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives,
table 4 (Mar. 20, 2010), and Congress adopted the CBO’s finding that the Act will
reduce the federal deficit, see Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1563(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 270.
More recent CBO projections indicate that the provision will yield $5 billion annually
by 2021. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf to Speaker John Boehner, at 9, table 3
36

Case: 11-1057

Document: 161

Date Filed: 04/08/2011

Page: 48

(Feb. 18, 2011). In short, the provision certainly bears at least “some reasonable
relation” to the “raising of revenue,” United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93-94
(1919), bringing it within the taxing power. See also Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S.
332, 353 (1928) (any “doubt as to the character” of a tax was removed because
provision raised “substantial” sum of $1 million per year).
B.

The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Not Punitive.

The Commonwealth urges that the revenue-producing nature of the provision
is immaterial because “the purpose of the penalty is to alter conduct in hopes that the
penalty will not be collected at all.” Pl. Br. 55. But it is “beyond serious question
that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even
definitely deters the activities taxed.” United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44
(1950). “Every tax is in some measure regulatory” in that “it interposes an economic
impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed.” Sonzinsky, 300
U.S. at 513. Accordingly, “‘the courts have sustained taxes although imposed with
the collateral intent of effecting ulterior ends which, considered apart, were beyond
the constitutional power of the lawmakers to realize by legislation directly addressed
to their accomplishment.’” Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44-45 (quoting A. Magnano Co. v.
Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 47 (1934)).
Thus, in Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 512, 513-14, the Court rejected the argument
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that a tax on firearms dealers “is not a true tax, but a penalty imposed for the purpose
of suppressing traffic in a certain noxious type of firearms.” In Sanchez, 340 U.S. at
44, the Court upheld a tax on marijuana transfers against an attack that rested “on the
regulatory character and prohibitive burden of the section as well as the penal nature
of the imposition.” See also Doremus, 249 U.S. at 93-94 (a tax “cannot be
invalidated because of the supposed motives which induced it”); Knowlton v. Moore,
178 U.S. 41, 59-60 (1900) (Congress may tax inheritances with a regulatory purpose);
License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 470-71 (1866) (Congress may tax intrastate sales of
lottery tickets and liquor with a regulatory purpose).
The Commonwealth’s argument echoes the contention rejected by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), where it was urged that
“Congress, under the pretense of exercising its power to tax has attempted to penalize
illegal intrastate gambling through the regulatory features of the Act.” Id. at 24. The
Commonwealth does not address the Kahriger decision, which the district court
mistakenly regarded as authority to second-guess Congress’s judgment and to declare
that revenue raised by the minimum coverage provision “is ‘extraneous to any tax
need.’” JA 1106-07 (quoting Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 31). Kahriger makes clear that
a provision’s regulatory purpose does not render resulting tax revenue “extraneous.”
The Lochner-era cases on which the Commonwealth relies, see Pl. Br. 60, were
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anomalous even at the time they were decided. See, e.g., United States v. One Ford
Coupe Auto., 272 U.S. 321, 328 (1926) (upholding tax whose “main purpose” was to
deter lawbreaking). They “produced a prompt correction in course,” Bob Jones Univ.,
416 U.S. at 743, and the Supreme Court has long since “abandoned the view that
bright-line distinctions exist between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes,” id. at 743
n.17. What remains of those Lochner-era cases is not a bar against regulatory taxes,
as Virginia suggests, Pl. Br. 60, but the principle that Congress may not rely solely
on the taxing power to impose “punishment for an unlawful act.” United States v.
LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931); see also Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 781 (1994).
The minimum coverage provision has none of the hallmarks of a “punitive”
sanction. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 778-79. It does not turn on the taxpayer’s
scienter. Cf. The Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 36-37 (1922). And, unlike in
cases where a “highly exorbitant” tax rate showed an intent to “punish rather than to
tax,” United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294, 295 (1935), the penalty under
the minimum coverage provision can be no greater than the cost of qualifying
insurance, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(1)(B). Cf. Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 45 (“rational
foundation” for rate of tax showed it was not punitive sanction in disguise).
Moreover, the penalty is imposed on a month-by-month basis, 26 U.S.C.
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§ 5000A(b)(1), confirming that it does not impose punishment for past unlawful acts.
Cf. The Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 36 (assessment was punitive where
“amount is not to be proportioned in any degree to the extent or frequency of the
departures”). In sum, the minimum coverage provision has none of the indicia of a
“punishment” that have been cited by the Supreme Court.
C.

The Validity of a Tax Does Not Depend on Its Label.

At bottom, the Commonwealth’s claim is that the minimum coverage provision
cannot be an exercise of the taxing power because the assessment is denominated as
a “penalty” rather than as a “tax.” Pl. Br. 54. But “it has been clearly established that
the labels used do not determine the extent of the taxing power.” Simmons v. United
States, 308 F.2d 160, 166 n.21 (4th Cir. 1962). Thus, Congress may use its taxing
power to impose assessments that it labels as “licenses,” License Tax Cases, 72 U.S.
at 474-75, “premiums,” Adventure Res., Inc. v. Holland, 137 F.3d 786, 793-94 (4th
Cir. 1998), or, as here, “penalties,” United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 275 (1978).
Nor was Congress required to invoke its taxing power in the Act itself. “[T]he
constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power
which it undertakes to exercise.” Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144
(1948); see also CSX Transp. v. Bd. of Pub. Works of W. Va., 138 F.3d 537, 540 (4th
Cir. 1998) (“wealth of precedent” shows that Congress need not recite its source of
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power); Usery v. Charleston Cnty. Sch. Dist., 558 F.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir. 1977)
(“Our duty in passing on the constitutionality of legislation is to determine whether
Congress had the authority to adopt the legislation, not whether” it correctly
identified “the source of that power”).
There can be no plausible contention that Congress intended to disclaim the
exercise of its taxing power. The taxing power was expressly invoked in the Senate
to defeat constitutional points of order against the minimum coverage provision. 155
Cong. Rec. S13,830, S13,832 (Dec. 23, 2009). And during the legislative debates,
congressional leaders defended the provision as an exercise of the taxing power. E.g.,
156 Cong. Rec. H1854, H1882 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Miller); id. at H1824, H1826
(Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Slaughter); 155 Cong. Rec. S13,751, S13,753 (Dec. 22, 2009)
(Sen. Leahy); id. at S13,558, S13,581-82 (Dec. 20, 2009) (Sen. Baucus).
Virginia notes that certain other provisions in the Affordable Care Act are
explicitly labeled as taxes. Pl. Br. 54. But Congress used the terms “tax” and
“assessable penalty” interchangeably in the Act’s employer responsibility provision,
in describing the payments owed under specified circumstances by a large employer
that does not offer full-time employees adequate insurance coverage. 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 4980H(b)(2), (c)(2)(D). Similarly, at a time when the Senate bill used the term
“excise tax” to describe the payment owed under the minimum coverage provision,
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the accompanying Senate Report described it as a “penalty ... accounted for as an
additional amount of Federal tax owed.” Compare S. 1796 (Oct. 19, 2009), with S.
Rep. No. 111-89, at 52 (Oct. 19, 2009). Nothing in the Act suggests that Congress
intended this terminology to have constitutional significance. If, however, there were
any doubt as to the meaning of the terms in the Affordable Care Act, the Court
properly would resolve that doubt in favor of the statute’s constitutionality.
Northwest Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009);
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
PART II: BRIEF AS CROSS-APPELLEE
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
For the reasons set out above and in our opening brief, Virginia lacks standing,
and its challenge to the minimum coverage provision fails on the merits. If the Court
were to conclude otherwise, however, it should reject the Commonwealth’s invitation
to expand the scope of the district court’s judgment and set aside hundreds of
Affordable Care Act provisions of unchallenged validity.
Plaintiff confuses the importance of the minimum coverage provision with the
standards for determining whether valid provisions of a federal statute may be
severed from a section of the statute that is held unconstitutional. If provisions are
“fully operative as a law,” they must be sustained “[u]nless it is evident that the
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Legislature would not have enacted those provisions ... independently of that which
is [invalid].” Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct.
3138, 3161 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Affordable Care Act
comprises hundreds of provisions, many of which are already in effect, and most of
which have no relationship whatsoever to the minimum coverage provision. Many
provisions implicate the rights and obligations of non-parties. The district court
properly adhered to Supreme Court dictates and “refrain[ed] from invalidating more
of the statute than is necessary.” Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984).
ARGUMENT
The District Court Properly Rejected the Commonwealth’s Request to
Set Aside Affordable Care Act Provisions of Unquestioned Validity.
A. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937), Justice
Jackson reiterated that, “[t]he cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save
and not to destroy.” To that end, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, “when
confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute,” courts must “try to limit the solution
to the problem, severing any problematic portions while leaving the remainder
intact.” Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[T]he ‘normal rule,’” therefore, “is that ‘partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the
required course,’ such that a ‘statute may ... be declared invalid to the extent that it
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reaches too far, but otherwise left intact.’” Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New
England, 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472
U.S. 491 (1985)). If provisions are “fully operative as a law,” they must be sustained
“[u]nless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions
... independently of that which is [invalid].” Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161
(quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 186 (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S.
678, 684 (1987))).
The Affordable Care Act includes hundreds of provisions that are “fully
operative as a law” and can function independently of the minimum coverage
provision. Ibid. Indeed, many of the Act’s provisions have already taken effect,
years in advance of the minimum coverage provision’s 2014 effective date. For
example, more than twenty sections of the Act made changes to Medicare payment
rates for 2011. These revisions have already been incorporated through notice and
comment rulemaking into Medicare payment regulations and implemented through
changes to nearly every major Medicare claims processing system, including those
for inpatient services, outpatient services, and physician services. See 75 Fed. Reg.
73170 (Nov. 29, 2010) (changes to physician fee schedule and other revisions to
Medicare Part B for calendar year 2011); 75 Fed. Reg. 71800 (Nov. 24, 2010)
(changes to hospital outpatient prospective payment system effective January 1,
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2011); 75 Fed. Reg. 50042 (Aug. 16, 2010) (revising hospital inpatient prospective
payment system for federal fiscal year 2011).
There is likewise no doubt that other Affordable Care Act provisions can
function independently. For example, the Act includes provisions, recently noted by
the Supreme Court, that “provide[] for more rigorous enforcement” of drug pricing
requirements. Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty., __ S. Ct. __ (Mar. 29, 2011),
2011 WL 1119021, *4. The Act includes provisions that re-authorized programs
already on the books, e.g., ACA §§ 4204(c), 5603; provisions that amended the False
Claims Act, ACA § 10104(j)(2); and provisions designed to eliminate Medicaid waste
and fraud, ACA §§ 6402(h)(2), 6411. Still other provisions include: “the prohibition
on discrimination against providers who will not furnish assisted suicide services; an
‘Independence at Home’ project for chronically ill seniors; a special Medicare
enrollment period for disabled veterans; Medicare reimbursement for bone-marrow
density tests; and provisions devised to improve women’s health, prevent abuse, and
ameliorate dementia, as well as abstinence education and disease prevention.”
Florida, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 285683, *34.
The Commonwealth offers no grounds for setting aside these provisions.
Because “[a] ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected
representatives of the people,” a court must “refrain from invalidating more of the
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statute than is necessary.” Regan, 468 U.S. at 652. Thus, “whenever an act of
Congress contains unobjectionable provisions separable from those found to be
unconstitutional, it is the duty of [the] court to so declare, and to maintain the act in
so far as it is valid.” Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684 (quoting Regan, 468 U.S. at
652). Virginia cites no support for the implausible assertion that severability analysis
turns on “the margin necessary to invoke cloture in the Senate.” Pl. Br. 66. And it
does not defend the reasoning of the Florida court, which invalidated the Affordable
Care Act in its entirety because the court attached unwarranted significance to the
absence of a severability clause. Florida, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 285683, *36.
The Supreme Court has long held that the “ultimate determination of
severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such a clause.” United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968). “‘In the absence of a severability
clause, ... Congress’ silence is just that — silence — and does not raise a presumption
against severability.’” New York, 505 U.S. at 186 (quoting Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S.
at 686). Reflecting this established precedent, both the Senate Legislative Drafting
Manual and the House Legislative Counsel’s Manual on Drafting Style “advise
drafters that a ‘severability clause is unnecessary’ unless Congress intends to make
certain portions of a statute unseverable.” Interpreting by the Book: Legislative
Drafting Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 120 Yale L.J. 185, 190 (2010).
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Virginia notes defendant’s recognition that the minimum coverage

provision is integral to the Act’s guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions.
Pl. Br. 66. That recognition would provide no basis for invalidation of any other
provision, much less the wholesale invalidation of hundreds of provisions sought by
the Commonwealth.
Moreover, even when particular provisions are integrally related, a court may
not address provisions that impose no burden on a plaintiff and that concern, instead,
the rights and obligations of parties not before the Court. Like the plaintiff in Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), the Commonwealth invokes principles of
severability to invalidate provisions to which it is not subject and which cause it no
harm. The Commonwealth does not claim to be injured by the guaranteed-issue and
community-rating requirements. Indeed, it is unclear why Virginia is intent on
obtaining an order that would invalidate requirements that allow its citizens to obtain
insurance regardless of their medical condition or history. Similarly, in Printz,
sheriffs challenged a scheme in which firearms dealers were required to notify local
law enforcement officers of proposed gun purchases, and to delay sales for a five-day
waiting period pending a background check. The Court held that the sheriffs could
not be required to conduct background checks, but declined to consider the claim that
the related waiting period provisions were not severable. The Court explained that
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“[t]hese provisions burden only firearms dealers and purchasers, and no plaintiff in
either of those categories is before us here.” Id. at 935. Although the severability
claims presented “important questions,” the Court had “no business answering them
in these cases” and “decline[d] to speculate regarding the rights and obligations of
parties not before the Court.” Ibid.
The Commonwealth also provides no support for its contention that the Act’s
“changes to Medicare and changes to Medicaid” should be declared invalid.
Pl. Br. 68. As discussed, many of the Act’s changes to the Medicare program —
which is the federal program that provides health benefits to the elderly and certain
disabled persons — have already taken effect. Many Medicare participants, for
example, have already received increased benefits for prescription drugs. E.g., 42
U.S.C.A. § 1395w–152. The Commonwealth does not and could not contest
Congress’s power to enact those Medicare changes, and, in any event, challenges to
Medicare payment rates are governed by special review procedures that constrain the
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Shalala v. Illinois Council on
Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000).
The Act’s changes to the Medicaid program — which is the cooperative
federal-state program that provides health benefits for low-income persons — are an
unremarkable exercise of Congress’s power to “‘attach conditions on the receipt of
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federal funds.’” New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203, 206 (1987)); see also id. at 171. The Commonwealth does not challenge
Congress’s power to make those changes, which are plainly “operative” on their own
and which will “serve[] Congress’ objective of encouraging the States” to provide
health benefits for low-income individuals. Id. at 187 (severing federal funding
conditions from the “take title” provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Act).
In short, although the district court erred in declaring the minimum coverage
provision invalid, it properly followed the “time-honored rule to sever with
circumspection, severing any ‘problematic portions while leaving the remainder
intact.’” JA 1114 (quoting Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329).
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CONCLUSION
The judgment in plaintiff’s favor should be reversed.
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